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de Alfonso XIII, 52 30203 Cartagena, Spain
Risk analysis can provide very suitable and useful information to manage the safety of critical civil in-
frastructures. Indeed, results of quantitative risk models can be used to inform prioritization of safety
investments on infrastructures’ assets and portfolios. In order to inform this prioritization, a series of risk
reduction indicators can be used. This paper reviews existing indicators for dam safety, tracks how equity
and efficiency principles are captured, propose additional indicators and provides insights on how tolera-
bility guidelines and benefit-cost analysis can also play a role in decision-making. All reviewed, analyzed
and/or combined indicators are later applied in a case study, a portfolio of 27 dams where 93 structural
and non-structural investments are prioritized. The case study shows that prioritization sequences based
on risk model results provide suitable and useful information, acknowledging that other concerns may
be conditioning decision-making processes. With the results of the case study, a full comparison between
all studied risk reduction indicators is made, and three indexes are calculated for all of them to measure
how close they are to a theoretical best.
Keywords: Dam Safety; Decision making; Risk management; Risk & probability analysis;
Quantitative analysis; Risk reduction indicators; Risk reduction principles; Equity & efficiency
1. Introduction
Critical infrastructures are those whose failure or destruction would entail serious consequences
for community safety, from economic damage to even loss of life. Some examples include electri-
cal power systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, water supply systems, transportation,
finance and banking, emergency and government entities (Clinton (1996)). In the hydraulic infras-
tructures field, one of the most critical infrastructures are large dams and protective dikes and
levees.
There is always a probability associated with critical infrastructure failure, even if it might be
very low. Thus, since there are always possibilities for adverse consequences to happen there is
always an associated risk. Risk Analysis is a useful methodology to characterize this risk and
establish priorities in critical infrastructure safety management since it allows the integration of all
existing information on threats, vulnerability and consequences (Moteff (2005)). It enables robust
and defendable safety decisions (Bowles (2001)) and the comparison of risk in all kinds of critical
infrastructures (Ayyub et al. (2007);Ellingwood (2005)).
A full Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) provides a lot of information and many insights into
the safety of a critical infrastructure. This detailed information can be used to better understand
safety issues, propose risk reduction measures and estimate their impacts. On the other hand, when
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dealing with a large portfolio of infrastructures and risk reduction measures, some kind of summary
indicator or indicators can be used in order to make manageable comparisons possible.
This paper reviews several risk reduction indicators and shows their utility to manage quanti-
tative risk results in complex systems with many alternatives of investment. These indicators can
be used to create prioritization sequences of risk reduction measures according to two risk reduc-
tion principles: equity and efficiency. This prioritization procedure is contextualized within the
Tolerability of Risk (TOR) framework, which was set out by UK’s HSE (2001) for risk evaluation
and management and has been widely used in dam safety (ANCOLD (2003); SPANCOLD (2012);
USACE (2014); USBR (2011a)). In order to show the utility of this procedure, it was applied to
the safety management of a group of 27 dams and different mitigation measures sequences were
obtained according to efficiency and equity principles.
This paper does not discuss the way in which QRA are carried out but rather takes their results
as its starting point to obtain these risk indicators. However, it is important to note that a single
indicator can never convey all the information that a full QRA provides, therefore, one must refer
back to the full QRA when looking for specific information. Moreover, recommendations based on
this type of indicators should not be taken as prescriptions, since there is always the possibility
that an important issue may not be adequately reflected in a summary indicator.
It should be mentioned that risk informed decision-making is very complex, and not only technical
aspects are important, but political, psychological and societal considerations also play a significant
role (Jonkman (2003)) and it may not be possible to include them in a quantitative risk analysis.
In such a broad and interconnected context, multi criteria analysis (Figueira et al. (2005); Keeney
& Raiffa (1993); Saaty (1988); Kabir et al. (2014)) is universally seen and used as a conceptual
and analytical tool to make all kind of decisions related, among many others, to investments.
2. Risk informed safety management based on equity and efficiency principles
2.1. Risk estimation
In risk analysis applied to critical infrastructures, risk can be defined as the combination of three
concepts: what can happen (critical infrastructure failure), how likely it is to happen (failure
probability), and what its consequences are (failure consequences, including but not restricted to
economic damages and loss of life) (Kaplan (1997)). Based on this definition, risk can be quantified
in several ways, and sometimes several conflicting definitions are used for similar concepts. Those
used in the present paper are defined below:
• Individual risk (RI): Several subtly different definitions of individual risk are in use. One of
them is the probability that an average unprotected person, permanently present at a certain
location is killed due to an accident resulting from a hazardous activity (Bottelberghs (2000);
Jonkman (2011)). This definition yields an individual risk distribution which varies spatially.
Another definition is the probability that at least one person dies as a result of the critical
infrastructure’s failure (SPANCOLD (2012)). This definition has the advantage of yielding a




p(e) · p(f |e) · p(d ≥ 1|f, e) · de (1)
Where the integral is defined over all events e under study, p(e) is the probability of an event,
p(f |e) is the probability of failure due to event e and p(d ≥ 1|f, e) is the probability that at
least one person dies due to this failure. If in an specific application it can be assumed that
all failures would produce at least one fatality, that is, if p(d ≥ 1|f, e) = 1, then individual
risk is equivalent to failure probability.
• Societal risk (RS): It is obtained by combining failure probabilities and the harmful con-
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sequences suffered by the population as a result of that failure (Jones (1985)). These conse-
quences are generally expressed in terms of loss of life. Societal risk is commonly represented
through FN curves that show the relation between loss of life and exceedance probability.
The area under these curves is equivalent to the expected number of deaths per year (Vrijling
& van Gelder (1997)). This number can be used to represent societal risk with a single value,
and it is also known as estimated annualized loss of life (Bowles (2004)). Mathematically, it




p(e) · p(f |e) · cS(f, e) · de (2)
Where cS(f, e) is the loss of life due to each failure f and event e.
• Economic risk (RE): Economic risk is obtained by combining failure probability and the
economic consequences of that failure (Jonkman (2003)). These consequences are expressed in
monetary units. Similarly to societal risk, economic risk can be represented with FD curves





p(e) · p(f |e) · cE(f, e) · de (3)
Where cE(f, e) are the economic consequences produced as a result of each failure f and
event e.
For risk calculation, the use of risk models (USBR (2011b)) that define the variables affecting
infrastructure safety and the relations between them is common. Once a risk model is set up, it is
then possible to estimate failure probability, consequences and risks.
2.2. Risk evaluation and management
Once the risk is calculated it must be evaluated in order to determine the need of implementing
mitigation measures. Risk evaluation is the stage where judgments and values are introduced
into the decision-making (whether explicitly or implicitly) by including the consideration of the
importance of the estimated risks (ICOLD (2005)). The procedure described in this paper is based
on the concepts of the Tolerability of Risk (TOR) framework HSE (2001) for risk evaluation and
management. Therefore, these core concepts and principles regarding risk, tolerability of risk and
risk management are not discussed in this paper, where such principles are taken in the same way
as the above mentioned references do. This framework is widely used worldwide for risk informed
dam safety management (ANCOLD (2003); SPANCOLD (2012); USACE (2014); USBR (2011a)).
Within this framework, risk evaluation is based on the concepts of unacceptable risk, tolerable risk
and broadly tolerable risk (HSE (2001)). From these concepts, several international organizations
have developed risk tolerability recommendations to evaluate whether a risk is tolerable or not.
Several examples for hydraulic infrastructures can be found (Bottelberghs (2000); NSWDSC (2006);
USACE (2014); USBR (2011a); Vrijling & van Gelder (1995)) for individual and societal risk.
Finally, the key part of the risk analysis process is decision-making for risk management. Decisions
are made after considering possible alternatives and analyzing their effect on infrastructure risk.
Generally, two principles are recommended to guide this decision-making process (HSE (2001);
ICOLD (2005); USACE (2014)):
• Equity: In the context of critical infrastructure safety management, this principle arises
from the premise that all individuals have unconditional rights to certain levels of protection
(Le Guen (2010)). Among the different risk components which have been presented (see
definitions in section 2.1), individual risk (the probability that at least one person dies as a
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result of the critical infrastructure’s failure) is the most related to this concept.
Hence, individual risk tolerability recommendations seeking a certain level of protection
for every individual of the population are related to the principle of equity. According to
HSE (2001), the application of this principle should prevail when individual risk is above the
recommended value of tolerability. There are numerous recommendations to establish this
value, varying according to the activity or industry under study. Some examples can be seen
in the Dutch regulations (Vrijling & van Gelder (1995)) and in the guidelines by USACE
(2014).
• Efficiency: This principle arises from the fact that society possesses limited resources which
must be spent in the most efficient way. When considering several risk reduction measures,
the one producing a higher risk reduction at a lower cost (the one that optimizes expenditure)
should generally be chosen first. This is usually the prevailing principle when risk is tolerable
(HSE (2001)). In this paper we suggest a distinction between two types of efficiency, depending
on the targeted risk:
◦ Societal efficiency: When the target risk to be reduced is societal risk.
◦ Economic efficiency: When what is analyzed is economic risk reduction, that is, the
searched strategy is the most advantageous from an economic point of view. According
to some authors (Bowles (2001)), this type of efficiency should only prevail when the
infrastructure complies with tolerability recommendations.
The efficiency principle is followed when a Benefit-Cost Analysis is made for risk informed
decision-making. This approach addresses societal and economic efficiency by aggregating
societal and economic risk (Baecher et al. (1980); HSE (2001); NRC (2014)). For this purpose,
loss of life is given an economic value (known as Value Per Fatality or VPF), estimated from
the population’s willingness to pay to acquire a certain level of protection.
In summary, two different principles are generally used to guide decision-making within the
tolerability framework: equity and efficiency. This can result in contradictions since what can be
an optimal measure from the equity point of view may not be so from the efficiency point of view and
vice versa. Decisions based on tolerability criteria and equity could lead to economically inefficient
investments but a pure efficiency approach does not include the societal views on unacceptable
risks (NRC (2014)).
The dilemma between efficiency and equity is also found in fields others than risk management,
such as decision-making about infrastructure construction (Albalate et al. (2012); Joshi & Lambert
(2007); Yamano & Ohkawara (2000)). Though in these cases the definitions of equity and efficiency
are slightly different, the philosophy and the dilemma between both concepts remain the same.
3. Review of risk reduction indicators
As explained in the previous section, different risk reduction principles can be followed to guide
safety management. Risk reduction indicators can be a useful tool to prioritize risk reduction
alternatives according to these principles. These indicators are obtained from the effect a measure
has on infrastructure risk and from its implementation and maintenance costs. In this section,
different risk reduction indicators are presented and their relation to the risk reduction principles
is explained. The main risk reduction indicators found in literature are:
• Cost per Statistical Life Saved (CSLS): This indicator is used to analyze risk man-
agement measures (HSE (2001)) in numerous fields such as aerospace (Stewart & Mueller
(2008)), health science (Lutter et al. (1999); Ramsberg & Sjöberg (1997)), soil pollution
(Khadam & Kaluarachchi (2003)), dam safety (ANCOLD (2003)) and road traffic safety (de
Blaeij et al. (2003)). This indicator shows how much it costs to avoid each potential loss of life







Where RbaseS is the risk expressed in loss of lives for the base case, R
mea
S is the risk in lives
after the implementation of the measure and Ca is the annualized cost of the measure that
includes its annualized implementation costs, annual maintenance costs and the potential
changes in operation costs generated by the adoption of that measure.
CSLS compares costs with societal risk reduction, so when considering several measures,
the measure with a minimal value of this indicator will be the one that employs the resources
in a most efficient way. Therefore, this indicator is based on the principle of societal efficiency.
• Economic Cost-Benefit Ratio (ECBR): This indicator (Bowles (2004); Parker (1987))
arises from the comparison of the costs of a measure with the benefits on the economic risk
reduction resulting from its implementation. According to the formula used in this paper,





• Adjusted Cost per Statistical Life Saved (ACSLS): This indicator (ANCOLD (2003);
Bowles (2001)) has the same structure as CSLS but introduces an adjustment of the annu-
alized cost to consider the economic risk reduction generated by the implementation of the
measure. It is obtained with the following equation:
ACSLS =
Ca − (RbaseE −RmeaE )
RbaseS −RmeaS
(6)
Where RbaseE is the economic risk of the infrastructure for the base case and R
mea
E is the
economic risk after the implementation of the measure.
ACSLS is usually used to apply the ALARP (As Low as Reasonably Practicable) (Bowles
(2004); HSE (2001)) criterion, by indicating that as long as tolerability recommendations are
respected, a measure can be rejected if it is not cost-efficient enough. ANCOLD’s Bulletin
112 (Bowles et al. (1999)) contains a simple example of measure prioritization for a portfolio
of dams by using ACSLS to apply the ALARP criterion.
ACSLS is focused on societal and economic efficiency, which are also the principles followed
in a Benefit-Cost Analysis. In this analysis, the chosen alternative would be the one with the
highest net benefits (Baecher et al. (1980); NRC (2014)). In annualized terms, net benefits
are defined with the following equation:
NB = (RbaseE −RmeaE ) + V PF · (RbaseS −RmeaS )− Ca (7)
Where V PF is the Value per Fatality applied. If the two previous equations are combined,
the following relation is obtained:
NB
RbaseS −RmeaS
= V PF −ACSLS (8)
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As can be observed in the previous equation, net benefits are zero when ACSLS is equal
to the value per fatality. Furthermore, the lower the ACSLS is, the higher the net benefits
are, although these two approaches can produce different prioritization sequences due to the
RbaseS −RmeaS term. The main advantage of using ACSLS to evaluate risk reduction measures
instead of Benefit-Cost Analysis is that the controversial issue of defining a Value Per Fatality
(citeViscusi2003) is avoided .
In addition to the former risk reduction indicators, it is also possible to directly use the risk re-
duction of individual, societal or economic risk produced by the mitigation measures (Bohnenblust
(1998); Bowles (2004); Khadam & Kaluarachchi (2003)). In order to compare these possibilities
with other risk reduction indicators in a homogenous way, the authors have put them in indicator
form: Individual Risk Decrease Index (IRDI), Societal Risk Decrease Index (SRDI)






Where RbaseI is the individual risk for the base case and R
mea
I is the individual risk after imple-
menting the measure. The same structure is followed for SRDI (with societal risk) and ERDI (with
economic risk). According to this structure, the lower these indicators are, the better the measure
is.
Finally, the authors propose two risk reduction indicators that allow the combination of eco-
nomic costs with failure probability (which is strongly related to individual risk) and therefore the
establishment of a relation between efficiency and equity:
• Cost per Statistical Failure Prevented (CSFP): This indicator expresses how much






Where pbasef is the annual failure probability for the base case and p
mea
f is the failure
probability after the measure implementation.
In many critical infrastructures (nuclear plants, large dams...), certain types of failures
(catastrophic failures) almost always produce fatalities. In these cases, failure probability
may be used as a proxy of individual risk and CSFP may be used as a proxy indicator of
equity. When applying this indicator to decision-making the authors recommend considering
a two-step process. When individual risk is not tolerable, the CSFP is used. Once individual
risk is below the tolerability level, then efficiency based indicators such as CSLS or ACSLS
may be more convenient.
• Adjusted Cost per Statistical Failure Prevented (ACSFP): This indicator presents
the same form as CSFP but introduces an adjustment on the annualized cost to consider the
reduction of economic risk produced by the implementation of the measure. It is calculated
with the following formula:
ACSFP =




This indicator is strongly related to the principle of economic efficiency and, as with CSFP,
in some cases it can also be used to measure equity. A two-step approach like the one described
for the CSFP is also recommended for the ACSFP.
Figure 1 uses a Venn diagram to visualize the relationship between indicators and principles
































Figure 1. Venn diagram showing the relationship between risk reduction indicators and efficiency and equity principles.
4. Obtaining and assessing implementation sequences of risk reduction measures
from risk reduction indicators
4.1. Obtaining implementation sequences
The relations explained in the previous section between risk indicators and risk reduction principles
are used to obtain implementation sequences of risk reduction measures that follow these principles.
These sequences are combined with the tolerability criteria to support a risk informed decision
making process.
Once a risk model for the base case and for each risk reduction measure is set up, it is possible to
calculate all risk reduction indicators for all measures. With this information, whichever measure
has the best value of the preferred indicator can be picked up to be implemented in the first
place. Then, the analysis is repeated assuming the first measure has already been implemented (in
order to capture in an adequate way possible nonlinearities in the superposition of measures). By
following this process iteratively a measure implementation sequence emerges, which is optimal1
with regard to the employed criterion.
1Under certain circumstances, due to nonlinearities in the application of risk reduction measures, it is possible that this
strategy will not yield the absolute optimum sequence. In these cases, the optimum sequence can still be obtained, but it is
computationally more costly. However, the sequence obtained with the simple iterative strategy is typically either optimal or
very close to optimal and will therefore be used throughout the paper.
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4.2. Variation curves
Variation curves are graphical representations of the results obtained when defining a sequence of
measures implementation. These curves show how risk or failure probability varies according to
the number of measures implemented or their cost. On the y axis, aggregated risk of the analyzed
infrastructures is plotted. On the x axis, either implementation step or accumulated costs are plot-
ted. Also, when costs are plotted, two types of costs can be used: annualized costs (annualized
implementation costs + annual maintenance costs + changes in annual operation costs) or annual-
ized and adjusted costs (total annualized costs - decrease in annual economic risk). Figure 2 shows














Figure 2. Generic representation of a variation curve showing four different prioritization sequences.
In this figure, each line represents the risk variation for a different prioritization sequence. In
this type of curves, the best prioritization is given by the curve that approaches the X axis first,
that is, the one that reduces risk or failure probability at a lower cost or with a lower number of
implemented measures. Figure 2 shows four different types of variation curves:
• Generic prioritization curve: represents the usual shape presented by measure implemen-
tation sequences when obtained by applying a risk indicator.
• Optimal curve: Depending on the axes defined in the variation curve, there is an optimal
measure implementation sequence. This sequence is the one that produces a more significant
risk reduction or failure probability reduction at a lower cost or with a lower number of steps.
Table 1 defines which variation curve produces the optimal sequence for each indicator (under
certain linearity assumptions). As this table shows, each indicator produces an optimal curve
in a different variation curve.
• Worst curve: This is the usual shape these curves have when representing for each sequence
the measure with the worst value of risk indicator, that is, the least appropriate measure
according to that factor. This curve and the optimal one delimit the space where all variation
curves of all possible measure implementation sequences lie.
• Average random curve: This curve represents an average shape of variation curves when
no particular risk indicator is followed to define the implementation sequence and instead,
measures are chosen randomly.
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Variation graph
Optimal Risk indicator X axis Y axis
CSLS Annualized measures cost Societal risk
ACSLS Annualized and adjusted measures cost Societal risk
ECBR Annualized measures cost Economic risk
IRDI Implementation step Individual risk
SRDI Implementation step Societal risk
ERDI Implementation step Economic risk
CSFP Annualized measures cost Failure probability
ACSFP Annualized and adjusted measures cost Failure probability
Table 1. Variation curves where each risk indicator produces the optimal result.
It is worth noting that all curves share the same origin point (current situation of the set of
infrastructures) and the same final point (situation of all infrastructures when all risk reduction
measures are implemented). This responds to the fact that what is being decided is not which
measures to adopt but in which order.
4.3. Assessing the closeness to theoretical best of a measure implementation
sequence
In order to assess how “good” a measure implementation sequence is, some kind of metric must be
used. Next, an index is proposed to accomplish this, the Closeness to Theoretical Best (CTB). It
measures how close a prioritization sequence is from the theoretical best, which would consist in
reducing all the risk in the first step, and is usually unachievable. In general, a sequence is better
than another one if it reduces risk faster.
Moreover, the concept of how “good” a measure implementation sequence is varies according to
the prioritization principle against which it is compared. A very appropriate sequence with regard
to efficiency may not be so with regard to equity. Hence, not 1 but 3 CTB indexes have been devised
in order to allow the assessment of efficiency and equity principles of a measure implementation
sequence.
The optimal sequence according to the equity principle is the one that causes higher individual





i · (log(RiI)− log(RendI )
CT · (log(RiniI )− log(RendI )
(12)
Where N is the number of steps of the sequence, RiI is the individual risk for step i of the
implementation sequence, RiniI is the initial individual risk, R
end
I is the individual risk of the last
point of the sequence, ∆Ci is the increase in annualized cost produced after implementing measure
i and CT is the total annualized implementation cost of all measures.
If it were possible to achieve the final individual risk with a null cost (best possible case), the
numerator would be 0, so CTB would equal 1. On the contrary, if individual risk was equal to
the original value for all measure implementation costs (worst possible case), the denominator and
numerator would be the same, so CTB would be 0.
The differences of each point of the sequence relative to the final individual risk are obtained using
logarithms. In this way, a decrease of an order of magnitude in risk is valued equally, irrespective
of whether it is in a low or high risk range. This is in accordance with the common practice of
showing FN and fN graphs in logarithmic scales.
The same structure has been followed to define a CTB index for the societal efficiency (replacing
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Figure 3. Definition of areas in variation curves in order to interpret CTB.
CTB indexes can have a graphical interpretation using the previously defined variation curves.
The numerator of the suggested indexes is equal to the area under the curve in figure 3 (Priori-
tization area) whereas the denominator is equal to the total area of the rectangle defined by the
initial and final points of the sequence (Total area). Thus, CTB can also be calculated with the
following equation:
CTB = 1− Prioritization area
Total area
(13)
The value of this index is 0 when the area under the variation curve is equal to the total area of
the rectangle and its value is 1 when the area under the curve is null. For each analyzed principle,
different variables are used in the axis of the variation curve to allow this graphic interpretation of
CTB indexes:
• Equity variation curve: It represents annualized cost on the X axis and failure probability
on the Y axis.
• Societal efficiency variation curve: It represents annualized cost on the X axis and
societal risk on the Y axis.
• Economic efficiency variation curve: It represents annualized cost on the X axis and
economic risk on the Y axis.
5. Case study: Management of a portfolio of 27 large dams
Next, a case study is shown where all presented prioritization strategies can be compared. This case
study concerns an existing group of 27 dams located in Spain belonging to the same owner and the
implementation of the presented measures is currently being studied in order to improve safety. It
is a very heterogeneous set of dams including structures of different typology (15 concrete gravity
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dams, 4 small diversion dams, 3 double-curve arch dams, 3 earthfill dams and 2 single-curve arch
dams), size (from 100.6 m to 11.6 m), construction year (from 1923 to even one currently under
construction) and reservoir volume (from 641 hm3 to 0.2 hm3).
The starting point for this case study are the results obtained in a Quantitative Risk Analysis
performed on each dam. As part of the analysis process, risk models were set up with iPresas
software (iPresas (2014)) for each dam. These risk models are based on event trees(SPANCOLD
(2012)) and they analyze the different ways in which a dam can fail (failure modes) calculating
their associated probabilities and consequences. Input data in the risk models were elaborated
during three years and they are the result of dams technical documents, working group sessions
and numerical models. Risk models were elaborated for normal and hydrological loading scenarios
and they include:
• Flood events probability.
• Probability of outlets availability for flood routing.
• Pool water levels probability.
• Flood routing results.
• Fragility analysis results for each failure mode. Fragility curves of different failure modes are
combined using Common Cause Adjustment techniques(SPANCOLD (2012)).
• Loss of life and economic consequences estimation results based on hydraulic models. Eco-
nomic consequences for failure cases also include the cost of losing the dam.
Detailed procedures followed to develop these risk models can be found in Altarejos-Garćıa et al.
(2012); Ardiles et al. (2011); Serrano-Lombillo et al. (2012a,b). Figure 4 shows an example of one



















































Figure 4. Risk model of one of the studied dams.
A total number of 93 measures were studied for the 27 analyzed dams. These measures came
from a list of actions already planned to a higher or lower degree by the operator to improve dam
safety along with the new needs revealed by the results of the Risk Analysis. Proposed measures
are not general measures for all the dams but each one is planned to be applied only in one dam.
Table 2 summarizes the risk reduction measures. As can be noticed, there is a great variety, with
measures being of both structural and non-structural nature.
Structural measures Non-structural measures
Improve gates realiability 8 Emergency Action Plan (EAP) 23
Improve foundation condition 8 EAP + com., edu. and coord. 23
Improve dam body 8 Improve monitoring system 5
Renew gates and valves 5 Additional freeboards 4
Reinforce parapet wall 3
Increase spillway capacity 3
Additional outlet works 2
Improve stilling basin 1
Table 2. Summary of analyzed risk mitigation measures for the group of 27 dams.
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Each proposed measured was budgeted by estimating implementation costs and maintenance
and operations costs resulting from this implementation. Following Spanish recommendations on
hydraulic infrastructures management (MMARM (2001)), the implementation cost of each measure
was annualized by distributing it along its lifespan with a discount rate of 5%. Then, the annual
maintenance and operation costs were added to the annualized implementation cost. In this way,
the total cost of every measure was expressed in monetary units (in this case, euros) per year.
Different measure implementation sequences were obtained by using all of the risk reduction
indicators defined in Section 3 as prioritization criteria. When doing these calculations, individual
risk was assumed to be equal to failure probability. This is a usual hypothesis in large dams (USBR
(2011a)) as the ones studied in this case, since dam failure would almost certainly result in at least
one fatality.
Incremental consequences were used to calculate societal and economic risks. Incremental con-
sequences are incremental losses or damage, which dam failure might inflict on upstream areas,
downstream areas, or at the dam, over and above any losses which might have occurred for the
same natural event or conditions, had the dam not failed (ANCOLD (2003)). Risk is then known
as incremental risk and is usually employed in dam safety (ANCOLD (2003); USACE (2014)).
According to USACE (2014), the proposed tolerability limit for individual risk is 10−4. Therefore,
a sequence combining ACSFP (with failure probabilities higher than 10−4) and ACSLS (with failure
probabilities lower than 10−4) was also calculated, following the recommendations in section 3. This
sequence is labelled ACSLS/ACSFP in the following figures and tables. Furthermore, an additional
sequence was obtained choosing in each step the measure with the highest Net Benefits according
to a Benefits-Cost analysis. For this purpose, a Value per Fatality of 1.26 Me was used according
to HSE (2001) recommendations. This sequence is labelled BCA.
Before obtaining indicator based prioritizations, a sequence corresponding to a random average
case was calculated to compare with the implementation sequences obtained from the application
of the different prioritization criteria. This case represents the results of the average risk variation
when no risk indicator is followed to define the sequence, but instead measures are chosen randomly
at every step. In order to determine this random average case 1,000 different random prioritization
sequences were generated. The average case was then determined by obtaining the average risk
variation of all of them for each implementation step. Figure 5 shows the results in the efficiency
variation curve. In this figure, they have been compared with the sequence obtained using the
optimum indicator (CSLS as indicated in Table 1) and with the sequence obtained with the worst
indicator (inverse of CSLS). As can be observed, the sequence obtained with the optimum indicator
performs much better than any of the random sequences, since it reduces risks with lower costs.
This fact justifies the use of risk reduction indicators to obtain sequences of risk reduction measures
more efficiently. It would be necessary to compute many random sequences to find the optimum
without these indicators since there are 93! ≈ 10144 possible sequences of measures.
Next, using all indicators presented in this paper different measure implementation sequences
were obtained for the set of dams under analysis. Figure 6 shows equity, societal efficiency and
economic efficiency variation curves for the different calculated indicators.
In each variation curve the indicator that produces a better sequence (more significant risk
reduction at a lower cost) is different. In the case of the societal efficiency curve, the optimal
sequence is given by the indicator CSLS, for the economic curve, it is ECBR and in the case of
equity, CSFP. Additionally, the worst implementation sequence was defined for each case, choosing
at each step the measure with the highest value of the indicator that produces the optimal sequence.
These sequences are also shown in figure 6.
The CTB indexes defined in section 4.3 were then used to numerically analyze the goodness
of the implementation sequences according to each prioritization principle. As table 3 shows, the
indicators that produce better values of societal efficiency are CSLS and ACSLS. The indicators
producing higher economic efficiency are ECBR and ACSFP. Finally, the indicators producing
better equity values are CSFP and ACSFP.


































Figure 5. Results of the 1000 randomly calculated cases and average random case represented in a societal efficiency variation
curve.
Indicator Economic efficiency CTB Societal efficiency CTB Equity CTB
CSLS 81.2% 90.0% 73.1%
ACSLS 87.7% 87.5% 79.0%
ECBR 94.6% 62.0% 91.6%
IRDI 86.9% 56.1% 89.4%
SRDI 71.8% 83.9% 59.1%
ERDI 90.5% 57.6% 88.6%
CSFP 91.7% 55.3% 93.5%
ACSFP 92.7% 55.3% 92.2%
ACSFP/ACSLS 92.1% 79.5% 91.1%
BCA 82.7% 72.5% 71.3%
Random average 38.2% 38.3% 34.4%
Worst societal ef. 5.6% 3.6% 9.8%
Worst economic ef. 5.2% 37.2% 4.2%
Worst equity 5.5% 36.3% 4.0%
Table 3. CTB indexes for each risk indicator.
they are based. Besides, according to the obtained results, indicators based on equity produce
good economic efficiency and vice-versa. This is a specificity of the chosen case study and it is
due to the fact that none of the introduced measures directly diminishes economic consequences
and that failure probability reductions produce a similar change of economic risk. Therefore, the
sequences defined by indicators IRDI and ERDI present very similar CTBs. Additionally, both
ACSFP and ACSLS have higher economic efficiency than CSFP and CSLS respectively, since they
include economic risk on their formulation. In order to compare graphically how societal efficiency
and equity principles are addressed for each indicator, the CTB indexes obtained for both principles
have been represented in figure 7.
Finally, on the one hand, the results of the BCA sequence show that only the first ten measures















































































































Figure 6. Implementation sequences for different risk reduction indicators represented in the variation curves for equity, societal
efficiency and economic efficiency principles.
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BCA
Figure 7. Comparison between efficiency CTB and equity CTB for each risk indicator.
nualized cost of these measures is 215,688e. On the other hand, the results of the ACSFP/ACSLS
sequence (the only sequence that combines equity and efficiency) show that USBR (2011a) and
USACE (2014) tolerability guidelines, are met in all the dams when 31 measures are implemented,
being the global annualized cost of these measures 1,511,697e. This comparison shows that deci-
sions considering equity and tolerability criteria can include measures that are not justified from a
pure efficiency point of view.
6. Discussion and conclusions
The paper presents a rationale for prioritizing risk reduction measures when investing in the safety
of a portfolio of hydraulic critical infrastructures. The principles framing such rationale go from
how effective the investments in remedial actions are, their costs and benefits or the possible
constraints on how they may comply with some well-established general statements on the hierarchy
of risk controls, such as the more individually focused equity or the more socially and economically
concerned efficiency.
The basis of the methodology relies on the fact that the relative merits of the options a decision
maker may have can be quantified by examining such principles through a number of indicators,
some of them originally developed, tested and used by the authors with a portfolio of 27 large dams.
From the issues of applying the methodology and indicators to inform the safety management of
such portfolio of dams, particular and general conclusions have been identified and are herein
summarized.
Starting with the more specific ones, the main discussions and conclusions arising from the study
presented in the paper are:
• The procedure outlined in this paper, based on risk reduction principles and its indicators,
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allows obtaining and assessing measure implementation sequences in a clear and simple way
from quantitative risk results. This procedure reduces significantly the required computations
to obtain an optimum prioritization sequence in complex portfolios with many proposed
measures. It also allows to track the impact of different principles, to combine them and to
compare them.
• It does not matter how quantitative risk results are built: as long as the former are reliable,
it does not make any difference in the procedure presented in this paper.
• Furthermore, the use of the Closeness to Theoretical Best (CTB) index proposed in this
paper can be a useful way to make quantitative comparisons between different sequences.
• As demonstrated in the case study, prioritization of different structural and non-structural
measures in a consistent and justifiable way can be accomplished by using the results offered
by risk models, even in heterogeneous groups of dams.
• The existing conflict between equity and tolerability criteria versus pure efficiency is high-
lighted with the results of the case study. On the one hand, tolerability criteria and equity can
promote alternatives which do not maximize benefits. On the other hand, a pure efficiency
approach does not include societal views on unacceptable risks and individuals’ rights to cer-
tain levels of protection. A compromise between these approaches can be reached combining
different risk indicators or different prioritization sequences.
• In practice, each critical infrastructure operator will choose the principles and tolerability
limits that reflect its values and objectives more adequately. Besides, management of criti-
cal infrastructure safety actions can incorporate many factors of administrative, societal and
economic order, difficult to quantify and that might condition decision-making. Within this
context, measure implementation sequences based on risk results provide a valuable infor-
mation to decision-making and in some cases can be an input to a more global multicriteria
analysis.
From a broader perspective on how this type of approach will impact the safety management of
any hydraulic critical infrastructure, some insights arising from this paper are:
• Having a more rational and structured quantitative information, able to capture different
values depending on the context (country, regulatory framework, liability, business culture,
etc.) will be in the benefit of any owner or decision maker regardless the specific type of
infrastructures managed.
• It will also enable a clear and transparent way to communicate options in decision making
both internally (to the upper management of a particular entity) and externally (to politicians
and the general public), which is a premise for good governance.
• Though the methodology utility has been proved for a portfolio of critical hydraulic infras-
tructures such as large dams, it can be easily envisioned how it would be possible to tailor
it for different types of civil infrastructures where best practices already include risk iden-
tification, calculation, evaluation, assessment and management (i.e. transportation, energy
production, etc.)
Finally, major challenges to be addressed when using the suggested approach to inform decision
making are, among others, to better understand and tackle the role of different sources of uncer-
tainty (natural, epistemic etc.) as well as to find a consistent manner to evaluate time issues such
as the expected time to complete a corrective action and the balance between short term and long
term actions.
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